Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies [pdf], Joint Special Operations University, December 2009
EXCERPT: "Most American and Pakistani political and military leaders agree that without a credible U.S.-Pakistan partnership, victory against Taliban and Al Qaeda is impossible. For such a partnership, shared goals must be matched by shared threats, and perceptions must follow demonstrable action. Washington and Islamabad agree that Al Qaeda must be defeated. Pakistan’s national security calculus—based on India’s influence in Afghanistan—however, treats Afghan Taliban as leverage and Pakistani Taliban as enemies of the state. Consequently, Afghan Taliban are provided asylum in Pakistan while they wreak havoc in Afghanistan, and Pakistani Taliban are attacked. While Pakistan has countered and fomented numerous insurgencies, this is the first time that it has done both to achieve its national security goals. This dual policy and disconnect between American and Pakistani threat perceptions is at the heart of Pakistan’s security paradox. Pakistan continues to indirectly counter (COIN) and foment (FOIN) insurgency in Afghanistan. Without acknowledging, explicating, and eventually changing this paradox, Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to descent into chaos."
Read the full report [pdf].
Related reports:
A sea change in Pakistan? Breaking down the arguments, Small Wars Journal, 15 March 2010
Related posts:
The AfPak strategy: Reactions in Pakistan, 12 March 2010
Taking on the Taliban, 4 March 2010
Pak's complex relations with militant groups hinder Afghan success, 26 January 2010
The Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, 12 January 2010
