The Pakistan Military's Adaptation to Counter-insurgency in 2009 [pdf], CTC Sentinel, January 2010
EXCERPT: "Faced with a rising and emboldened insurgency in its tribal belt, Pakistan's military has come under fire in recent years for failure to adapt its military doctrine, which is based around conventional warfare, to tackle the internal threats of insurgency and terrorism... The Pakistan military’s failure has been attributed to a number of poor tactical choices since 2002, including: 1) excessive focus on enemy targeting and 'high-value targets'; 2) overdependence on large-scale multi-unit forces (mostly brigade level) rather than smaller units dispersed among the population; 3) frequent deployment of forces to static garrisons or defensive positions inhibiting proactive actions; 4) inadequate resources for flexible responses to contingencies such as quick reaction forces; 5) over-reliance on kinetic 'direct-action' operations and heavy firepower; and finally 6) anunderuse of local forces' capacity and knowledge. While the characterization of Pakistan’s doctrinal focus on conventional warfare is correct—an unsurprising feature given the country's high external threat environment - and unlikely to change, the past year has witnessed substantial improvement in the conduct and outcomes of Pakistani military operations. The sustainability of recent gains remains contingent on future political choices, civilian capacity, and successive operational phases. This article, however, contends that the Pakistan military’s efforts in Bajaur Agency, the Swat Valley, and South Waziristan Agency have already showcased a diligent institutional learning process that has produced significant tactical adaptations yielding increasing tactical success."
Read the full article [pdf, page 9].
Related articles:
Forgetting "Hold" and "Build" in Islamabad [blog], The Majlis, 21 January 2010
Counter-terrorism at the expense of counter-insurgency will doom Afghanistan and Pakistan: US officials [blog], The Long War Journal, 24 September 2009
Army hosts counter-insurgency seminar with Pakistan, Army News Service, 30 July 2009
Lions and jackals: Pakistan's emerging counter-insurgency strategy, Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 15 July 2009
Petraeus calls on Pakistan to redirect military focus, The Washington Post, 25 April 2009
Wanted in Pakistan: Competent counter-insurgency [blog], The New Yorker // Interesting Times, 23 February 2009
Related reports:
Development and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, The National Bureau of Asia Research, November 2009
Pakistani capabilities for a counterinsurgency campaign: A net assessment, New America Foundation via the Human Security Gateway, 17 September 2009
Related posts:
After setbacks, a glimpse of success in Waziristan, the "last frontier", 11 January 2010
Insurrection, terrorism, and the Pakistan army, 11 December 2009
New counter-insurgency strategies lead to success in South Waziristan, 4 December 2009
Army campaign far from adequate despite war's significance, 2 December 2009
The Pakistan military: Change and continuity, 16 October 2009
